In the context of resource allocation on the basis of responsive priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the deferred acceptance rule to satisfy a consistency principle. In this note we extend this result to the domain of substitutable priorities, complementing results of Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kumano (2009).
Introduction
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of responsive priorities, Ergin (2002) studies the deferred acceptance rule (Gale and Shapley, 1962) . He establishes that Pareto efficiency, groupstrategyproofness, and consistency are equivalent properties. Moreover, he identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure to guarantee that the deferred acceptance rule satisfies any of these properties. Kojima and Manea (2010) point out that in practice priorities may often be non-responsive but substitutable. For the more general framework with substitutable priorities, Kojima and Manea (2010) provide axiomatic characterizations of the deferred acceptance rule. In particular, they extend part of Ergin's (2002) main result by showing that Pareto efficiency, groupstrategyproofness, and Maskin monotonicy are equivalent properties. Kumano (2009) complements these findings of Kojima and Manea (2010) by identifying a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure to guarantee that the deferred acceptance rule is Pareto efficient when priorities are substitutable. The combined results of Kumano (2009) and Kojima and Manea (2010) do not completely generalize Ergin's (2002) main result since consistency of the deferred acceptance rule is not dealt with. In this note we fill this gap.
Model
The notation and description of the deferred acceptance rule is due to Kojima and Manea (2010) . There is a set of agents N and a set of proper object types O. There is also a null object type, denoted ∅. Each object a ∈ O ∪ {∅} has quota q a ; q ∅ = |N |. Each agent i is allocated exactly one object in O ∪ {∅}. An allocation is a vector µ = (µ i ) i∈N assigning object µ i ∈ O ∪ {∅} to agent i. For each a ∈ O ∪ {∅}, we have that µ a ≡ {i ∈ N : µ i = a} satisfies |µ a | ≤ q a .
The preferences of each agent i over the set of objects is represented by a linear order R i . We denote by P i the asymmetric part of R i , i.e., aP i b if only if aR i b and a = b. An object a is acceptable to agent i if aP i ∅. Let R = (R i ) i∈N be the preference profile of all agents. For any
We denote by A and R the sets of allocations and preference profiles, respectively. An allocation rule ϕ : R → A associates an allocation with each preference profile. At R, agent i is assigned object ϕ i (R), and object a is assigned to the set of agents ϕ a (R).
An allocation µ Pareto dominates another allocation µ ′ at R if µ i R i µ ′ i for all i ∈ N and µ i P i µ ′ i for some i ∈ N . An allocation is Pareto efficient at R if no allocation Pareto dominates it at R. An allocation rule ϕ is Pareto efficient if ϕ(R) is Pareto efficient at R for all R ∈ R. An allocation rule ϕ is group strategy-proof if there exist no N ′ ⊆ N and R, R ′ ∈ R such that
We make the following two assumptions on each priority. First, Ch a is substitutable, i.e., for all
An allocation µ is individually rational at R if for all i ∈ N , µ i R i ∅. The allocation µ is blocked by a pair (i, a) ∈ N × O at (R, Ch) if aP i µ i and i ∈ Ch a (µ a ∪ {i}). An allocation µ is stable at (R, Ch) if it is individually rational at R and is not blocked by any pair (i, a) ∈ N × O at (R, Ch). Since Ch is substitutable, the so-called deferred acceptance rule, denoted ϕ Ch , yields a stable allocation ϕ Ch (R) at (R, Ch) (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990 , proof of Theorem 6.5). The allocation ϕ Ch (R) is obtained through the deferred acceptance algorithm as follows.
Step 1: Each agent applies to his most preferred acceptable object under R (if any). LetÑ 1 a be the set of agents applying to object a. Object a tentatively accepts the agents in N 1 a ≡ Ch a (Ñ 1 a ), and rejects the agents inÑ 1 a \N 1 a .
Step t, t ≥ 2: Each agent who was rejected at step t − 1 applies to his next preferred acceptable object under R (if any). LetÑ t a be the new set of agents applying to object a. Object a tentatively accepts the agents in N t a ≡ Ch a (N t−1 a ∪Ñ t a ), and rejects the agents in (N t−1 a ∪ N t a ) \ N t a . The algorithm terminates when each agent is either tentatively accepted by some object or has been rejected by every object that is acceptable to him. Each agent tentatively accepted by a proper object at the last step is assigned that object, and all other agents are assigned the null object. The allocation reached by the deferred acceptance rule is the agent-optimal stable allocation at (R, Ch). That is, ϕ Ch (R) is stable at (R, Ch), and all agents weakly prefer ϕ Ch (R) to any other stable allocation at (R, Ch) (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 6.8) .
Since efficiency is one of the goals of the social planner in resource allocation problems, Kojima and Manea (2010) develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficiency of the deferred acceptance rules. (ii) ϕ Ch satisfies Maskin monotonicity. 1 (iii) ϕ Ch is group strategy-proof. Ergin (2002) 1 For the definition of Maskin monotonicity we refer to Kojima and Manea (2010) and Maskin (1999). and shows that it is a sufficient and necessary condition on the priority structure to guarantee that ϕ Ch satisfies either of the properties in Proposition 1.
Kumano (2009) derives a generalization of the acyclicity condition introduced by
A cycle is constituted of distinct i, j, k ∈ N and a, b ∈ O such that that there are disjoint (and possibly empty) sets N a , N b ⊆ N \{i, j, k} satisfying (C) j ∈ Ch a (N a ∪ {i, j}), k ∈ Ch a (N a ∪ {j, k}), and i ∈ Ch b (N b ∪ {k, i}).
If there is no cycle, then we say that the priority structure is acyclical. Combining Propositions 1 and 2 yields a partial generalization of the main result of Ergin (2002, Theorem 1), who considers acceptant responsive priority structures (which are a strict subclass of acceptant substitutable priority structures). 2 The generalization of Ergin (2002, Theorem 1) is not complete since Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kumano (2009) do not consider the consistency of the (extended) deferred acceptance rule. In the next section we fill this gap.
Result
We first introduce consistency. Let Ch be a priority structure. An economy is a triple (N ′ , q ′ , R N ′ ) where N ′ ⊆ N and q ′ ≡ (q ′ a ) a∈O with q ′ a ≤ q a for all a ∈ O. The extended deferred acceptance rule, denotedφ Ch , associates with each economy (N ′ , q ′ , R N ′ ) the allocation that is obtained by applying the (accordingly adapted) deferred acceptance algorithm to (N ′ , q ′ , R N ′ ) and the restricted priority structure (Ch a |2 N ′ ) a∈O . Given the original economy (N, q, R), an allocation µ for (N, q, R), and a subset of agents N ′ ⊂ N , the reduced economy of (N, q, R) with respect to µ and N ′ is the economy (N ′ , q µ , R N ′ ) where for all a ∈ O, q µ a ≡ q a − |µ a \N ′ |. Consistency of the extended deferred acceptance rule requires that once an allocation for the original economy is determined and some agents receive their assigned objects before the others, the rule should not change the assigned objects of the remaining agents in the reduced economy. Formally, a priority structure Ch induces a consistent extended deferred acceptance ruleφ Ch if for each N ′ ⊂ N and each preference profile R, µ |N ′ =φ Ch (N ′ , q µ , R N ′ ) where µ =φ Ch (N, q, R). The following result completes the generalization of Ergin's (2002) main result.
Proposition 3. Each property in Propositions 1 and 2 is equivalent to the consistency of the extended deferred acceptance ruleφ Ch .
Proof. In view of (i) ⇔ (iii) in Proposition 1, it is sufficient to prove that (i) ⇒φ Ch is consistent ⇒ (iii). The proof is an adaptation of Ergin's (2002) proof.
(i) ⇒φ Ch is consistent: Assumeφ Ch is not consistent. Then there are N ′ ⊂ N and R such that µ |N ′ =φ Ch (N ′ , q µ , R N ′ ) where µ =φ Ch (N, q, R). Since µ =φ Ch (N, q, R) = ϕ(R) is a stable allocation in the original economy (N, q, R), it immediately follows that µ |N ′ is stable in the reduced economy (N ′ , q µ , R N ′ ). Since priorities are substitutable it follows from Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Theorem 6.8) thatφ Ch (N ′ , q µ , R N ′ ) Pareto dominates µ |N ′ in the reduced economy (N ′ , q µ , R N ′ ). Therefore, in the original economy, the allocation ν defined by Pareto dominates µ. Hence, ϕ Ch is not Pareto efficient. ϕ Ch is consistent ⇒ (iii): Assumeφ Ch is consistent. From the proof of Lemma 1 in Pápai (2000) it follows that strategy-proofness and nonbossiness imply group strategyproofness. 3 Since priorities are acceptant substitutable, it follows that for any object a ∈ O and any two sets of agents N ′ ⊂ N ′′ ⊆ N , |Ch a (N ′ )| = min(q a , |N ′ |) ≤ min(q a , |N ′′ |) = |Ch a (N ′′ )|. Therefore, the priorities satisfy the law of demand (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005, page 923) . Hence, by Theorems 11 and 12 in Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) , ϕ Ch is strategy-proof. To complete the proof we show that ϕ Ch is nonbossy. Let i ∈ N and R, R ′ ∈ R be such that ϕ Ch i (R) = ϕ Ch i (R ′ i , R N \{i} ). Let µ ≡ ϕ Ch (R) and ν ≡ ϕ Ch (R ′ i , R N \{i} ). Note that since µ i = ν i , the reduced economies (N \{i}, q µ , R N \{i} ) and (N \{i}, q ν , R N \{i} ) are the same. Hence,φ Ch (N \{i}, q µ , R N \{i} ) =φ Ch (N \{i}, q ν , R N \{i} ). On the other hand, by consistency, µ |N \{i} =φ Ch (N \{i}, q µ , R N \{i} ) and ν |N \{i} =φ Ch (N \{i}, q ν , R N \{i} ). Hence, µ |N \{i} = ν |N \{i} , which together with µ i = ν i implies that ϕ Ch (R) = µ = ν = ϕ Ch (R ′ i , R N \{i} ). Hence, ϕ Ch is nonbossy.
